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NOTES
A PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The time has come to establish a Department of International Trade. For the
past fifty years, numerous cabinet-level offices have shared responsibility for creating and implementing foreign trade policy. 1 Although the Constitution designates
the responsibility for foreign trade commerce to Congress,' Congress has historically delegated that authority to the Executive.3 Presently, the Executive has no
single mechanism for analyzing, formulating and implementing foreign trade policy. Rather, the decisions are made on an ad-hoc basis without a guiding philosophy or coordinating mechanism. 4 This lack of coherent trade policy has left our
trading partners befuddled and discouraged5 and inhibited the growth of U.S. export trade.6

The importance of trade cannot be overstated. 7 Despite trade's ever increasing

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

For the first one hundred or more years of this country's existence, international trade policy was
"primitive to non-existent." S. COHEN, THE MAKING OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC POLICY
7
(1977). It consisted mostly of tariffs which Congress legislated in order to protect certain domestic
products. The Executive branch's only role in this process was to collect the import duties through
the Customs offices. In 1934, Congress made its first official delegation of trade policy authority to the
President via the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Since 1934, the Executive has taken an
ever increasing role in the creation and implementation of foreign trade policy. For further explanation of the early history of trade policy formation, see id. at 6-7.
Until 1962, the Department of State exercised the dominant role in trade policy. See Graham, The
Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems, 13 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 221 (1980).
In 1962 there was a move in Congress to take foreign trade out of the State Department and put it in
the Commerce Department. However, as one knowledgeable observer described it, the proposal to
consolidate trade policy formulation in Commerce resulted in "an explosion from Labor and Agriculture saying no, Commerce represents industry and we are not having that . . . . Out of default it
went to the Executive because no one could figure out where else he (sic) should put it." To Create a
Departmentof InternationalTrade and Investment: Hearings on S. 1990 Before the Senate Commission on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978) (statement of Harald B. Malmgren, former
deputy Special Trade Representative) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson S. 1990]. In 1971, a report to
the President found that over 60 government agencies are involved in foreign economic policymaking.
Williams Commission Report, p. 275; United States InternationalEconomic Policy in an Interdependent World, report to the President submitted by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, July 1971 (GPO, 1977).
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have the power... to regulate commerce with
foreign nations."
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was the first official delegation of authority to the
Executive. This initial delegation gave the State Department the authority to negotiate bilateral agreements and signaled the beginning of the Executive's interest and influence through the State Department. See S. COHEN, supra note I, at 7.
The idea of policy formulation as adhoc and crisis-oriented will be developed later in this article. See
infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Briefly, no mechanism exists at present to anticipate such
trade crises as the old embargo of 1973 or the Soviet grain transactions of the mid- 1970's. When crises
arise, the Executive must react in a limited time with limited choices. As a result, policies are reactive
instead of preventive. See Cook & Williamson, Improving US. Policymaking in InternationalTrade,
14 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 16 (1979). See also infra notes 42 and 43.
See infra notes 16 and 28-30.
Drawing from the information infra note 16, when our trade representatives are unable to speak with
one voice, their bargaining position is weakened and trade negotiations are slowed. The end result is
trade at a less efficient pace than is possible, and a consequent slowing of growth.
Four percent of the work force in the United States is directly dependent on exports alone. As much
as ten percent of the work force is indirectly supported by exports. S. COHEN, supra note 1, at 233.
The United States is the world's largest agricultural exporter, supplying almost 20% of world agricul-
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relevance to U.S. economic health, critics are quick to point out that the present
approach to trade is not in the best interests of the United States.8 As the trade
deficit soars past the $120 billion mark, 9 members of Congress, regardless of their
political affiliation,' ° must ensure that foreign trade interests are given the consideration they deserve. Rather than subordinating foreign trade interests to other
foreign policy goals," Congress must create a process by which variables of every
trade decision are systematically analyzed. This note will examine the inadequacies of the current approach to foreign trade policy creation, analyze proposed
alternatives to trade policy formulation, and propose a solution to the trade policy
dilemma.
EXISTING PROBLEMS IN POLICY FORMATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION

Four major problems currently exist in the formation of the United States'
trade policy. First, numerous agencies attempt to create their own limited version
of trade policy to fit their specific needs. Second, the United States has no single,
credible negotiator to represent it at all multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. Third, the agencies that negotiate the agreements are often not responsible
for implementing those agreements, thereby resulting in inconsistent and sporadic
implementation. Fourth, researchers are structurally separated from decisionmakers with the result that crises are not foreseen. When crises arise, decisions result that are not in the best interests of the country since they are made
quickly in order to avoid a worsening of the crisis.
The first critical problem is the multiplicity of sources of trade policy. Trade
policy currently emanates from over fifteen different federal agencies and departments,12 each having a legitimate' 3 although in some cases peripheral, t4 interest

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

tural trade. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
1984 121-23.
See, e.g., Moynihan, Global Trade: To Get the U.S. Act Together, N. Y. TIMES May 3, 1983, at A26,
col 4. "America has done itself and the world some considerable service by pressing liberal trade
policies over the past 40 years. Still, it is clear that the pure free trade theory is no longer serving us
well." Id.
"The 1983 deficit in merchandise trade was about $65 billion, approaching twice the previous record,
which was set in 1982. A deficit in the neighborhood of $110 billion is forecast for 1984, three times
the 1982 level." ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1984 supra note 7, at 42-43. The actual
trade deficit for 1985, however, was far above the projected estimate. The Commerce Department
reported that the foreign merchandise trade deficit for 1984 was a record $123.3 billion. For January
1985, the monthly deficit was $10.3 billion, up 28% from December, 1984. After reviewing the January figures, Commerce Secretary Baldridge predicted that the 1985 deficit would be $140 billion. N.Y.
Times, March 1, 1985, at D6, col. 1.
See Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1. Senator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) noted that there "has
been a feeling-whether it was a Democratic or Republican administration-that there has been no
effective policy." Id. at 30. Neither party has been able to overcome the institutional problems of trade
policy making. Bipartisan efforts are needed to accomplish effective trade reorganization.
See infra notes 15, 20, 45, and 63.
The fifteen include the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the departments of Commerce, State, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, Defense, Energy, and the Interior, the federal
agencies including the International Trade Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Council for Economic Advisors, the National Security Council, and
the Agency for International Development. For a discussion of the lack of coordination between these
agencies on foreign trade issues, see Graham, supra note 1. One commentator contends that the list of
agencies which participate in trade policy formulation is theoretically endless. See S. COHEN supra
note 1, at 52-57.
Other departments' interests in trade are legitimate for two reasons. First, policy goals of other agencies are at times inextricably linked to trade interests, so that to properly fulfill its duties, a department
must sometimes concern itself with trade issues. For example, the Defense Department is concerned
with the sale of high technology to Eastern Bloc countries because of its vast implications for defense
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in trade policy. Since there is no single clearinghouse or "trade-broker", t5 each
agency researches, formulates, and struggles to implement its own trade policy
tailored to its peculiar needs and point of view. Consequently, conflicting policies
emerge 6 while costly resources are wasted performing redundant research on
trade issues.1 7

One notable example is the East-West trade negotiations.1 " At

least five government departments or agencies have East-West trade bureaus perand national security. Second, interests of many departments have been legitimized by congressional
approval of their participation in trade activities either by statute or practice. See infra note 21.
14. Some agencies have peripheral interests in that the primary purpose of the agency or department is not
trade. Rather, isolated elements of trade arise as an ancillary interest of the department.
15. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, in support of legislation proposing a merger of the Office
of the USTR and the Commerce Department, argued: "[T]rade policy has to be brokered among the
other Cabinet departments, instead of being advocated. Yet all of those other departments act as
advocates for their own interests, which sometimes turn into competing interests. Witness Defense
policy or Treasury policy-those policies are actively advocated by their departments. Trade is not;
the brokering involved too often forces trade policy into the lowest common denominator acceptable
to the rest of the executive branch. Again, we end up lacking strong policy because of our institutional
problems." Baldridge, At Last, Hope for Coherent Policy, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, at C2, col. 3.
16. Numerous examples demonstrate the conflicting trade policies emerging from U.S. agencies. In the
1978 Senate hearings on the creation of a new trade department, Harald Malmgren, former deputy
Special Trade Representative, spoke of the confusion surrounding the emergence of trade policy and of
the embarrassing and awkward position in which trade negotiators often find themselves because of
their inability to speak for the entire United States Government or to implement their agreements.
Specifically, he pointed out that tariff concessions made at the negotiating table can be undone by
exchange rate uncertainty, an area not controlled or influenced by the trade negotiator. When trading
partners press for comprehensive agreements, negotiators are forced to admit their lack of authority,
weakening their bargaining position. Malmgren points out that this division of responsibility is exploited by aggressive foreign negotiators. Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1, at 30.
Six years later, the problem persists. A recent illustration is the December 1983 meeting of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock was in Paris negotiating an OECD agreement setting policies for the ExportImport Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Commerce Undersecretary for International Trade Lionel E. Olmer was
urging the president of the Ex-Im Bank to implement a conflicting policy designed to protect the
American steel industry. Brock was negotiating for an agreement among industrialized nations to
eliminate subsidies for loans for steel mills built in the Third World while still giving nonsubsidized
loans to those able to afford them. Olmer, on the other hand, was urging a policy to completely halt
all loans, cutting off all future financing of Third World steel mills by the Ex-Im Bank. Olmer believed
this approach was required by the "severely depressed steel market and dramatically increasing competition for steel imports from developing countries." N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1983, at Dl col. 6. According to Robert W. Crandall, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a steel specialist,
Olmer's suggested policy "would amount to a new form of protectionism-banning Western technology from developing countries to protect the dying dinosaurs of the developed world." Id. Olmer's
protectionist policy is typical of Commerce's desire to protect existing domestic industry regardless of
long-term cost. Brock, however, urges a policy open to free trade and competition and adamantly
opposes protectionist policies. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1983, at D3, col.4. These two conflicting policies
reflect the deep philosophical divergence between the two offices on overall trade policy goals. Conflicting signals confuse our trading partners, severely undermining the USTR's negotiating authority,
ultimately leading the country down an uncertain path for future trade development.
17. Daniel Minchew, testified:
I find inefficiency and waste stemming from redundancy of effort and resources among the
economic agencies, making our trade policy apparatus at times resemble a costly imitation of
the dark ages . . . . There's an East-West trade bureau in Treasury, Commerce, State, and
Defense. Congress wanted more information so U.S.I.T.C. gives Congress quarterly reports on
East-West trade . . . . When you find the East-West trade redundancy multiplied several
times over in the Federal trade establishment, it makes me think you can bring together a
Department that in total will be much smaller than the sum of all the people presently involved
in trade policy and probably able to do a more effective job.
Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1,at 3, 11 (testimony of Daniel Minchew, chairman in 1978 of the
U.S. International Trade Commission).
18. East-West trade refers to trade between the Soviet Union and the United States. East-West trade
negotiations originated as a part of detente in the early 1970's. The Trade Agreements Act of 1972
initiated U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade. For a detailed discussion, see K. GRZYBOWSKI, EAST-WEsT TRADE 3,
158-65 (1973). See also A. BECKER, ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. (1983), and R.
HOYT, WINNERS AND LOSERS IN EAsT-WEsT TRADE (1983).
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forming virtually the same research functions.1 9 Problems arise when each
agency manipulates its research data to arrive at conclusions that support that
agency's
inherently limited goals rather than the goals of a comprehensive trade
20
policy.
To be sure, Congress has mandated some division of policymaking authority. 2
Often, however, the departments and agencies have expanded the scope of the
delegated power as their needs have necessitated. Their authority in the new areas
has legitimized itself through custom and usage. In order to clarify what is indeed
the legitimate authority of each department and agency, Congress needs new legislation which specifically delegates each element of trade policy formulation to
one central organization.
In 1979, Congress and President Carter attempted a clarification of the Congressional mandates on trade issues by allocating clear-cut responsibility for specific trade activities in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979.22 The 1979
Reorganization Plan sought to delegate policymaking and negotiations to the

newly formed Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2 3 and
granted the day-to-day implementation of those policies to the Commerce Depart19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

The five departments or agencies are Treasury, Commerce, State, Defense and The International
Trade Commission. See supra note 17.
For example, the Department of Defense has an Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy whose duties, according to the OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1984/85 164 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT MANUAL], "include
oversight of DOD activities relating to ... East-West economic policy, including East-West trade,
(and] technology transfer issues .... The Defense Department's analysis of a certain issue, for
instance sale of computers to an Eastern bloc country, will focus on issues important to the Defense
Department, not on maximizing trade opportunities or boosting an industry in the United States. This
is not to say that defense considerations might not be more valid on this or any issue. Rather, when
trade issues are repeatedly subordinated to other policy goals and are used merely as tools by other
departments, it is not surprising that trade policy as a whole is an incoherent conglomeration of conflicting policies. If trade policy has merit, which our economic position strongly suggests it does, then
it must have its own forum for systematic analysis and implementation.
Congress has given trade functions to a number of agencies:
1) Office of the Trade Representative, 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1982). The USTR "shall have primary
responsibility. . . for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of, United States international trade policy .
Id. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 F.R. 69273, 93 Stat. 1381,
§ (1)(b)(l).
2) The Commerce Department, under Reorganization Plan No. 3, § 2(c), aquired an Undersecretary for International Trade to oversee and coordinate Commerce's "operational responsibilites" in
trade.
3) The Department of State has an Undersecretary for Economic Affairs who advises the Secretary
of State on foreign economic policy, including international monetary affairs and trade. The Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs has overall responsibility for formulating and implementing policy
regarding foreign economic matters, including trade policy. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 20,
at 385. Furthermore, the 1979 Reorganization Plan (§ 7) specifically did not remove the State Department's power and involvement in trade issues. See infra note 29.
4) The Department of the Treasury has an Assistant Secretary for International Affairs whose
duties include the formulation and execution of international monetary and trade policies. 31 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1982). See also GOVERNMENT MANUAL supra note 20, at 437.
5) The Department of Defense and its Secretary, established in 5 U.S.C. 101 (1977), have oversight
of trade issues concerning East-West trade and technology transfers. See supra note 20.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69273, 93 Stat. 1381 (1979). Under pressure from
Congress, President Carter joined with the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and
Means Committee to formulate a reorganization proposal to consolidate most trade responsibilities in
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce. The plan intended to
shift responsibility among the existing agencies to reduce the roles of the State and Treasury Departments. See Graham, supra note 1.
The United States Trade Representative is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.
The office of the USTR is an office within the Executive branch. The trade representative is required
to "report directly" to the President and Congress, but tends to act as an agent of the President.
Section l(b)(1) of the Reorganization Plan states that the Trade Representative shall "serve as principal advisor to the President on international trade policy." See also § 19 U.S.C. 2171.
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ment.24 Unfortunately, many of the Reorganization Plan's directives were not
complied with, particularly at the highest levels of policymaking.25 Specifically,
the Commerce Department and the USTR have ignored this Congressional attempt to better delineate authority and have continued their tug of war over
which office will lead the
2 6 trade negotiations and which will have the final say on
policy implementation.
The struggle among the numerous agencies over trade policy formulation gives
rise to a second crucial problem: the United States has no single trade negotiator.
The 1979 Reorganization Plan purported to give the USTR a clear mandate to
represent the United States in all multilateral trade negotiations. 27 Despite this
intended clarification, the Commerce Department continues to intervene and attempt to negotiate international trade agreements. 28 The problem of no single
negotiator is exacerbated when other departments decide to assert leadership on
trade issues important to their own policy goals.29 Multiple negotiators propound
24.

Section l(b)(2) of the Reorganization Plan No. 3 gave the USTR (formerly the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations (STR)) responsibility to conduct international trade negotiations. Section
2(1), in conjunction with specifics contained in the President's message, ordered Commerce to implement those agreements. See President's Message to Congress, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1729

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

(Sept. 25, 1979). For a more complete discussion of how the reorganization plan redistributed responsibilities, see Graham, supra note 1, at 231-34.
See supra note 16 and infra notes 28-30.
For a comprehensive history of this struggle, see Graham, supra note 1.
Section 1(2) of Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra note 22.
The 1979 Reorganization gave the USTR's office "lead responsibility for the conduct of international
trade negotiations." Id. However, it simultaneously gave the Secretary of Commerce "operational
responsibility for major nonagricultural international trade functions of the United States Government, including . . . monitoring compliance with international trade agreements to which the United
States is a party." Id. at § 2(a). The Commerce Department, frustrated from implementing agreements it has not negotiated, has often chosen to thrust itself into the negotiating forum.
A good example of the Commerce Department's intervention is reported in Madison, Trade Focus.
MITI Anyone? 15 NAT. J. 665 (1983). According to Madison:
It was difficult to tell, for example, who was the lead negotiator in last year's high technology
working group. Both James M. Murphy at the trade office and Clyde V. Prestowits at Commerce were described as being in charge. Before U.S. Trade Representative William Brock
could announce the high-tech agreement in Tokyo, Commerce had issued a press release in
Washington. More recently, Commerce and the trade office have been fighting about who will
negotiate with the Japanese over the targeted-industries issue. While David R. MacDonald,
deputy trade representative to USTR Bill Brock, insists that the trade office has the lead, Commerce is making a pitch for participation.
Then there is the story of two negotiators, one from Commerce, one from the trade office,
sent to Europe last month to try to settle a major U.S.-European Community dispute. The two
set up parallel negotiating sessions without including their counterpart. And each was aware
all the time that the other was making the same appointments.
Id. Thus, the 1979 Reorganization only served to institutionalize existing problems. See also supra
note 17 describing conflict in the OECD talks.
Often, the President is forced to arbitrate disputes among the numerous trade policy making agencies,
as demonstrated by this account of an incident involving the State Department. The importance of
presidential action when agencies are deadlocked is underlined by a case involving auto imports from
Japan. During Japanese Foreign Minister Kayodoshi Ito's visit to the United States in March, the
Washington Post reported that then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig "had taken charge of the administration's sensitive talks with Japan on auto imports, planting his flag in a new policy frontier to
the surprise of the Japanese and the consternation of U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock." Wash.
Post., Mar. 25, 1981 at Al, col. 5. The article sparked a strong response from USTR spokesmen and
congressional trade leaders in both the Senate and House. Haig defended his involvement by maintaining that "the issue of foreign trade is a fundamental aspect of the nation's foreign policy." Haig
further maintained that although the USTR is charged by statute with responsibility for trade policy
across the board, the foreign policy aspect of the issue required that State Department and USTR have
joint responsibility. Ahearn, PoliticalDeterminantsof U.S. Trade Policy, 26 ORBIS 418, 424 (1982).
In many respects Haig was correct. While the 1979 Reorganization Plan did give all negotiating
powers to the USTR, it also stated in § 7, entitled "Responsibility of the Secretary of State," that
"[n]othing in this reorganization plan is intended to derogate from the responsibility of the Secretary
of State for advising the President on foreign policy matters, including the foreign policy aspects of
international trade and trade related matters." § 7 Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra note 22. Thus, Haig may
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multiple policies which undermine the credibility of any one negotiator and confuse U.S. trading partners.30 The negotiating process stalls31 and ultimately becomes ineffective or even counterproductive.
The third crucial problem with the existing trade policy is that its structure
impedes the flow of information to and from policymakers. Policy, once negotiated, is extremely difficult to implement since the agencies which formulate the
policy are not responsible for its implementation. Specifically, the 1979 Reorganization Plan gave the sole responsibility for negotiating the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 issues to the USTR.33 The plan, however, gave the
Commerce Department responsibility for implementing the GATT agreements.34
It then completed the cycle of confusion by giving the USTR responsibility for
policy supervision and coordination of all GATT matters.35 This system of dual
responsibility for different aspects of the same issues causes discord between policy
and practice. The Commerce Department's interpretation or understanding of a
trade agreement can be intentionally 36 or accidentally3 7 different than that of the

USTR. As a result, the policy implemented may be radically different than the
policy agreed upon.3" Furthermore, although the USTR has statutory responsi-

30.

31.

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

have felt he was exercising a legitimate power of the Secretary of State. This exemplifies another
failure of the 1979 Reorganization's intended clarifications.
This problem has existed for sometime:
[There is a need to] lend a focus to our Government Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and
other trade organization activities which have in the past been diffused by having as many as a
dozen agencies representing us at a single conference. Foreign delegates should perhaps be
forgiven if they have wondered just how many American governments there are since there
were so many diverse opinions from supposedly one delegation.
Cook & Williamson, supra note 4, at 21.
Typical of how the lack of a single leader slows down the decisionmaking process was the response to
the Russian cancellation of grain purchases in the mid-1970's.
It was a typical example. We [the Office of the STR] couldn't handle it. Everything stops
when you get to a crisis. . . . Sometimes the STR can scurry and do it-sometimes not ....
[In this case he couldn't.]. . . .Friday it got worse, and we had to get into a meeting with
Kissinger and the Russians and we stopped the world grain market all weekend and created
utter chaos doing that.
Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 4, at 28 (testimony of Harald B. Malmgren, ex-deputy STR). See also
supra note 30. This is an example of how devastating it is to be without a leader during a crisis. A
crisis exploded that no one had been responsible for monitoring. The STR scrambled to respond but
they had to defer to Secretary of State Kissinger. It was a trade crisis created and then exacerbated by
the State Department. The State pushed for the grain deal and wanted control of the resolution of the
crisis but the State Department had not been monitoring the situation closely enough to preempt a
crisis.
GATT is a body of rules as well as an international organization intended to expedite international
trade. Periodic rounds of world-wide negotiations are held where tariff and trade agreements are
reached. 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS (1969).
Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra note 22, § l(b)2.
Id., § 2a.
Id., § l(b)3(a).
Commerce could intentionally "misinterpret" the USTR's intention in an agreement. For instance, by
yielding to its domestic bias, Commerce may decide not to effectively implement an agreement that it
believes would harm domestic industry.
Congress might simply misunderstand an agreement it did not negotiate.
An example of the Commerce Department attempting to implement an agreement different than the
one agreed upon by the USTR at a multilateral negotiating session is discussed at supra note 16. The
Commerce Department was directing the Export-Import Bank to follow a policy that would protect
domestic steel production. The USTR was simultaneously finalizing an agreement at a meeting of the
Organization for Economic Development that was directly contrary to the policy advocated by the
Commerce Department. This situation highlights an ambiguity that remains after the implementation
of The Reorganization Plan of 1979. Section 1(3)(a) gave the USTR responsibility for policy guidance
for the OECD while § 3 gave both the USTR and the Secretary of Commerce equal positions to serve
"ex officio and without vote" as members of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank. Thus,
the USTR was implementing an agreement that it did not have the power to enforce. The Commerce
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bility for properly implementing the agreements, it lacks the means and staff to
adequately do so. 39 The USTR-Commerce dichotomy is only the most obvious
example of what occurs with every other agency that attempts to comply with
USTR-negotiated agreements.
The fourth crucial problem with existing trade policy is that the structure for
developing trade policy prevents the flow of information from the research staff to
the policymakers. Policymakers and researchers tend to address the same problem within different conceptual frameworks. Structural separation further complicates the problem, so that research done in a targeted area often does not flow
to policy planners or negotiators.' Because the negotiators work separately from
the analysts, they are often unaware of the true parameters of certain problem
areas 4 1 and fail to anticipate future problems that are detectable. 42 Trade
problems which could have been avoided are not recognized until they reach crisis
proportions.4 3 In the crisis situation, ad hoc remedies are thrown together without indepth planning or realization of the consequences on foreign trade or domestic industry. Thus, United States trade policy is often reactive and crisisoriented instead of preventive and well-planned."
In sum, the existing foreign trade structure has four major problems. First,
numerous agencies develop self-serving and limited trade policies without regard
for overall trade policy. 45 Second, no single credible negotiator presents the

39.
40.

41.

42.
43.

44.

45.

Department was advocating and attempting to have the Ex-Im Bank implement a policy radically
different from the one agreed on in Paris by the USTR.
The Office of the USTR has a staff of only 131 people. The Commerce Department has 34,457 employees. GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 1983, at 336 (1983).
See Cook & Williamson, supra note 4, at 18-19. They note:
We knew in the 1960's that we could have an energy crisis, but there was no effective mechanism to bring facts together with potential solutions until the lines of waiting automobiles extended three blocks from the filling station ....
In this case, as in so many others, the experts understood the problem, yet the institutional
mechanism did not exist for presenting alternative solutions to those who had to act. In this
light, both the Russian grain deal and the oil crisis become more understandable. A gap between information gatherers and decision makers made it impossible to predict the problem
and fully understand its consequences. Unfortunately, nothing has changed.
Id.
As an illustration, in 1968, the Commerce Department did an extensive study on export of commercial
aircraft, concluding with a comprehensive report and recommendations. This information was never
given to a negotiator or chief policymaker. Despite the 1979 reorganization, Commerce retains the
responsibility for implementation and research and the USTR is responsible for negotiations and policy oversight. Precious resources and research are wasted in disputes over jurisdiction and authority.
An example of this is the oil crisis of 1973. See supra note 40.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 4, at 5 (testimony of Daniel Minchew, Chairman of the U.S.
International Trade Commission). Minchew noted:
If we learn any lesson from the range of commodity crises we have seen in this decade, involving products like oil or steel or sugar, it ought to be that, in trade, it is vitally important to be
able to predict and deal with problems before they reach the crisis stage. Historically, no single
government agency has felt primarily responsible for doing this. Consequently, we have not
made use of available data to foresee and head off difficulties while they are still in the formative and management stages. We have had to wait until a problem was actually on top of us
before we started pulling together the necessary information and forming a plan of action. We
have become truly crisis-oriented in our international trade policy and policy-making.
Minchew also pointed out that much talent and expertise in the government is misdirected and wasted
because of this short-term, crisis orientation when what is needed are long-term solutions. Id.
See Cook & Williamson, supra note 4, at 18. Cook and Williamson claim that "American foreign
trade policy is organized in such a way that we have no choice but to favor the particular over the
general economic welfare, the expedient over the long-term view and the reactive over the preventive
solution." Id. As an example, President Carter reacted in the "crisis management fashion" which the
two preceding administrations also used when he created a 60-day Interagency Task Force to report
on export expansion. Since export expansion is a massive problem that needed major legislation, the
Export Trading Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 4001 was only a partial solution to a problem that clearly
could not have been resolved by a 60 day task force.
In 1978, Daniel Minchew, Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission, stated that a trade
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United States' trade position at all multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations.
Third, since the agencies that negotiate trade agreements frequently do not implement them, implementation of trade agreements is often sporadic and inconsistent. Fourth, the structural separation of researchers from decisionmakers leads
to crisis-oriented ad hoc trade policies which are often not in the country's best
economic interests.4 6

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Congress has not ignored the problems in foreign trade structure. Over the
past five years, Congress has suggested several different proposals to resolve the
problems of foreign trade policymaking and implementation. A review of these
proposals will reveal their shortcomings and illustrate the essential elements of a
successful comprehensive proposal.
Departmental Solutions
Department of InternationalTrade and Investment
In 1977, Senators William Roth, Jr. (R-Del.) and Abraham Ribicoff (D-N.Y.)
introduced a bill to establish a Department of International Trade and Investment
(DITI).4 7 The bill, S. 1990, proposed transferring to DITI the functions and duties of several commissions, organizations, and departments.4 8
Although hearings on S. 1990 were held in 1978, 49 the bill was never reported
out of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.5 ° S. 1990 had the right

46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

controversy was decided by the strongest department, depending on the issue, with no reason, logic, or
consistency. He states that "trade is important in State and it is important in Treasury and it is important in Agriculture and in Commerce, Labor and Defense, but it is not the most important thing in
any one of these departments. Therefore, it never seems to percolate up consistently as a top priority."
Hearingson S. 1990, supra note 1, at 13, 18. It often seems instead that the Department or Secretary
with the loudest voice in the President's ear wins the trade debate. Another theory is that "when
extremely volatile issues affect more than one agency, the working relationship that evolves between
the affected agencies, the force of personality and viewpoint, access to the President, and enjoyment of
the President's confidence usually determine who will predominate." Graham, supra note 1, at 236.
Responding to economic crises such as the oil embargo of 1973 after the crises hits means the U.S. is
responding out of desperation, after it has lost most of its bargaining power. Such a position is not in
the best economic interest of the country.
S. 1990. Introduced on Aug. 3, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
Specifically, § 6(a) of S. 1990 transferred to the new Department of International Trade and Investment all the functions of the then Special Representative for Trade Negotiations as well as the duties
of the International Trade Commission (see explanation below), the Export-Import Bank (see below),
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (see below), and all of the functions of the Departments
of State, Commerce, and Treasury relating to commercial affairs and export promotion (§ 6(b)l), international investment policy (§ 6(b)2), and negotiation and implementation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (§ 6(b)3).
The United States International Trade Commission studies all aspects of import and export of
products to and from the United States. It is an independent agency which makes recommendations
and gives reports to the President, Congress, and other Government agencies. See GOVERNMENTAL
MANUAL, supra note 20, at 637.
The Export-Import Bank "facilitates and aids in financing exports of United States goods and
services" through a variety of programs. These programs "take the form of loans on the issuance of
guarantees and insurance, so that exporters and private banks can extend appropriate financing without taking undue risks." Id. at 487.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation aids the financing for investment projects in developing nations. It offers insurance and backs loans as well as grants some direct loans. The main goal
of OPIC is to support private investment while aiding the United States balance of payments through
creation of profits, jobs, and U.S. exports. See id. at 635.
Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1.
Jurisdictional squabbles within congressional committees often kill reorganization proposals. This is
especially true of trade which involves such a large number of agencies and crosses so many lines of
power. 15 NAT J. 665, Mar. 26, 1983.
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idea of concentrating all foreign trade programs in one area, but in some ways it
went too far. The bill would have transferred too many lower-management, daily
business activities to the new Department. For example, S. 1990 gave the new
Secretary responsibility for all the functions of the Export-Import Bank."1 This
would include responsibility for the general banking business that the ExportImport Bank performs.5 2 This is a relatively trivial matter in comparison with the
other major policy functions the new department would be resolving. The agen53
cies are much better equipped to handle their own daily management affairs.
The matter which does need to be clarified is from whom should the agency receive supervision and policy direction. As long as it is clear which office - Commerce or the USTR - is to give the Export-Import Bank its policy direction, then
further intervention is unnecessary, especially in daily activities. In addition to
the minor functions of some important, though small, agencies, S. 1990 also delegated to the new department responsibilities of several ancillary agencies such as
the U.S. Customs Service. S. 1990 also delegated to the DITI all of the domestic
economic analysis bureaus presently in the Commerce Department. " The total of
all these new delegations would have made DITI too cumbersome to function
efficiently.
Departmentof Economic Affairs
At the Senate hearings on S. 1990, witnesses proposed alternative approaches
to organizing a new Department of Trade." One alternative was a Department of
Economic Affairs that would handle both domestic and international economic
issues.56 This proposal, however, contains the same flaw as S. 1990 -overburdening the new Department through the inclusion of domestic economic affairs. Inclusion of the domestic sector blurs the trade focus and would make a new
Department prone to advocating policies that protect domestic sectors rather than
promote foreign trade.57 A trade policy disproportionately concerned with domestic industry stunts existing trade programs and discourages the establishment
of new trade agreements by shutting the door to imports. 58
51.
52.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

S. 1990, supra note 47, § 6(f).
12 U.S.C. § 635 (a) provides that the "objects and purposes of the [Ex-Im] bank shall be to aid in
financing and to facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of commodities. . . . [I]n connection
with and in furtherance of its objects and purposes, the bank is authorized and empowered to do a
general banking business except that of circulation ....
"
Neither the Secretary nor the staff of a trade department should be spending time on "general
banking business" or other lower-level, though important, matters. Rather, they should be geared to
broader policy issues with an oversight mechanism to observe implementation of daily activities.
One of the chief advantages of the Ex-Im Bank is its autonomy. It is a self-sustaining organization
that attempts to remain competitive with export credit subsidized by foreign governments. It attempts
to supplement and encourage private capital rather than competing with it. U.S. Trade Expansion
Efforts and Problems: Field Hearingat Iowa State Universisty before the Subcomm. on Monetary and
Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) (testimony of Richard
Heldridge, then Director-Designate, U.S. Export-Import Bank of Washington, D.C.).
§ 6(d)(2) of S. 1990. As part of the Treasury Department (44 U.S.C. § 1381), Customs administers the
Tariff Act of 1930 as well as other customs laws. See GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 20, at 440441.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1990, supra note I (testimony of Harald B. Malmgren).
Id.
See N.Y. TIMES May 5, at D3, col. 4. See also infra note 58.
The ECONOMIC REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1984, supra note 7, has succinctly stated the problem of
protectionism:
Protectionism usually succeeds in increasing the income of the sector seeking protection.
However, it imposes costs on other sectors that more than outweigh the benefits for the pro-

tected sector. These costs are of three kinds. First are the effects on the purchasing power of
consumers. A tariff or quota on imports cannot succeed in raising the prices received by domestic consumers. Second are the effects on our industries that use the output of the sector in
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The development of a Department of Trade focusing only on the promotion of
foreign trade would avoid such problems. At the hearings on S. 1990, former
Deputy Special Trade Representative Harald Malmgren suggested linking the
new trade department with national security or foreign policy institutions.5 9 This
format, however, would continue to subordinate trade issues to other pertinent,
but separate, considerations without resolving existing problems.
Agency Solutions
Two interagency solutions to the trade policy dilemma have been proposed.
One proposal suggests an interagency format with a "lead agency" responsible for
coordinating the trade activities of all the departments.' This format does not
create any new bureaucracy since existing agencies would continue to perform the
daily trade activities.6 t Congress could shuffle the responsibility for specific trade
activities among existing departments through legislation, or it could allow the
lead agency to make all necessary delegations of responsibility. A second interagency proposal involves the creation of a council to coordinate and guide the
State, Commerce, Treasury, and other departments in setting trade policy.6 2
The problem with both of these interagency proposals, however, is that they
would not resolve the existing overassumption of authority by certain departments. Agencies would be hesitant to subordinate themselves to what has in the
past been a coequal agency or department. Since the proposal does not suggest
the creation of a new staff which would be loyal to this new council or agency, the
fighting between existing departments would continue without a mediator or unbi-

ased referee. Furthermore, an agency lacking departmental status 63 also lacks the
requisite efficiency 6' and authority to implement its decisions. Without a staff to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

question as an input into their own productive process. Protection for the Steel industry raises
costs for candy manufacturers, and so forth. Third are the effects on export industries. The
dollars that foreign countries earn by selling to the U.S. market are useless to them unless,
sooner or later, they spend them on U.S. exports. Usually it is difficult to identify the specific
U.S. export industry that would benefit from increased trade. When the dollars come back to
the United States, it will not necessarily be in the form of spending by the same foreigners that
originally earned them, nor in the same year. But in one recent example, the connection is
clear: China has indicated that if the United States cuts off imports of textiles from it, China
will cease purchases of agricultural products from the United States.
Id. at 58-59.
Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1, at 25.
Graham, supra note 1, at 229.
This has been referred to as the "minimalist" approach since it requires a minimum amount of reorganization. See id. at 230. For an example, see H.R. 4567, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Id. at 230. Such a council would be similar to the now defunct Council on International Economic
Policy which functioned inefficiently in the early 1970's. In 1976, Congress chose not to extend the
CIEP's mandate due it its poor performance. See S. COHEN, supra note 1, at 69-73.
Minchew testified that one of the CIEP's chief problems was lack of department status, which limited
its authority and its weight. He went on to say "I think if you have a Cabinet level officer making the
arguments for trade policy decisions, a Cabinet level officer is more likely to swing his or her weight
effectively with other Cabinet officers" thereby ensuring that trade issues will not be subordinated to
other administration goals without proper consideration. Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1, at 12.
Minchew also said: "[I]f the head of a department if going to be able to hold his own against the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce,
or Labor or Defense, that person is going to have to have Cabinet-level status" . . . . Id. at 15
(testimony of Daniel Minchew, Chairman in 1978 of USITC).
Minchew stated:
Over the past decade, I have watched the Federal Government's approach to international
trade policy. . . . What I have seen is the growing inadequacy of an interagency committee
system which, when it was first conceived to deal with trade problems, worked very well, but
more recently, as the pace of this nation's involvement in international trade has picked up, has
found itself increasingly unable to cope.
Id. at 3 (testimony of Daniel Minchew). Senator Roth also commented about the inefficiency of the
interagency system: "[W]hen we have several agencies dealing with the same problem, part of their
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research issues and implement decisions, an agency would address trade issues in
66
a haphazard manner 65 and its management would tend to be crisis-oriented
rather than preventive and well-planned.
The Commerce Department Solution
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) has recently introduced a bill 67 proposing that the Commerce Department absorb the entire office of the USTR; assume
the trade functions of the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Labor,
State, Transportation, and Treasury; and include the Export-Import Bank,68 the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 6 9 the Small Business Administration,7"
the International Development Agency,7" and the International Trade Commission." The Commerce Department was chosen because it was "the most available place ' 7 3 to coordinate policy. According to the United States Government
Manual: "The Department of Commerce encourages, serves and promotes the
nation's international trade. . . ,,7' Despite this description, however, the Commerce Department is an innappropriate department to handle international as
well as domestic trade since it tends to serve and promote domestic industry interests before the interests of international trade.7 5 Some associate Commerce with a
protectionist philosophy and fear that if the Commerce Department and the
USTR were to merge, the Commerce Department's domestic interests would
dominate.76
The most noteworthy feature of Senator Moynihan's bill is the inclusion of the
trade functions of the Department of Agriculture.7 7 Despite the major role that
agriculture plays in American foreign trade,7 1 Congressional proponents of a

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.

77.
78.

attention is being spent on interagency disputes and rivalry rather than trying to meet that challenge."
Id. at 12.
An example of haphazard implementation of policy decisions was the Treasury Department's limited
or nonexistent enforcement of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. For a full discussion of
this poor enforcement, see infra note 99 and Graham, supra note 1, at 227. See also supra note 44 for a
discussion of haphazard decisionmaking.
See supra notes 40-44.
S.21, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S89 (1983).
See supra note 48.
See supra note 48.
The Small Business Administration (72 Stat. 384, 15 U.S.C. 631) offers loan assistance and other
financial supports to small businesses. Certain responsibilities can be delegated to it from the Secretary of Commerce. See GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 20, at 611-15.
The Agency for International Development assists people of certain developing countries to develop
their human and economic resources. It is part of the International Development Cooperation
Agency. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 20, at 627, 629-33.
See supra note 48.
Moynihan, Global Trade: To Get The US. Act Together, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 20, at 31.
"Commerce tries to have domestic industry interests," says Harald B. Malmgren, ex-deputy STR.
Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 1,at 33. Senator John Heinz (R-Pa.) responded that, "I get the
impression that over the years no matter who was Secretary of Commerce that somehow it never gets
very involved in these trade issues . . . . [Commerce] was created to be an advocate of a healthy
private sector." Since this statement was made in 1978, Commerce, under the leadership of Malcolm
Baldrige, has changed its philosophy in that has made a concerted effort to get involved in trade issues.
However, this has only increased confusion at a point when the USTR's office could have handled
these same issues quite well on its own under the leadership of William Brock. The existing conflict
between Baldrige and Brock highlights the inadequacies of the present system.
Representative Barber B. Conable Jr. (R-N.Y.) believes that Commerce would dominate the merger,
and domestic interests would dominate Commerce. The result would be a protectionist leaning bureaucracy. Farnsworth, Washington Watch: Intense Debate on Trade Plan, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1983,
at D2, col.1.
S. 21. See supra note 67.
The United States supplies almost 20% of world agricultural trade (see supra note 7). In fiscal 1983,
agricultural exports amounted to $34.8 billion, about one-quarter of total farm sales revenue. Besides
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change in our foreign trade structure have avoided the controversial step of including agriculture among the responsibilities of a new trade department. 79 Despite this controversy and anticipated farm lobby opposition, legislators must
recognize the crucial importance of including agriculture in any comprehensive
trade policy formulation. By so doing, agriculture and the entire country will
benefit."0 Thus, despite the opposition, legislators must resolve themselves to including agriculture among the responsibilities of a new Department of Trade.
In January 1983, Senator William Roth (R-Del.) introduced the Trade Reorganization Act of 1983 to create a new and independent Department of Trade.8 '
Although this bill, S. 121, meets one of the crucial needs of any reorganization by
limiting the Commerce Department's mandate regarding trade negotiations,82 it
still has major flaws. S. 121 proposes a major consolidation without precisely
83
defining the roles of the Departments of State and Treasury in foreign trade.
Congress should clarify this ambiguity to avoid the duplication and power struggles that currently exist. The bill also fails to clarify which department has ultimate responsibility and authority over agricultural trade matters. 84 Finally, the

79.

being a large part of our own economy and balance of payments, agriculture can be a vital strategic
weapon. An example of how it was used improperly, to the detriment of the whole U.S. economy, is
the 1970's Russian grain deal:
Before the 1970's, grain was in surplus; the use of stockpiles as a foreign policy tool had
little effect on the U.S. economy. But our decision to sell grain to Russia in 1972 upset our
economic balance. In short order we caused a rapid increase in domestic grain prices which
helped further inflation; we put a severe strain on our transportation system which in turn hurt
other segments of our economy, and we lost much of our ability to aid other countries with
foodstuffs because of a fear of setting off further inflation. The Russians then cancelled 19751976 orders at the same time that the Agriculture Department announced record winter wheat
crops.
Opening trade with the Soviet Union is valuable, but even today the Government is not
dealing with the consequences of grain sales in a rational, far-sighted manner. Americans now
realize that the U.S. cannot again make such major commitments without a full understanding
of the resulting strains that can be placed on our economy and our foreign policy.
Cook & Williamson, supra note 4, at 17. See also supra note 31.
The other plans discussed here have not included agriculture. In fact, S. 121, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. S593 (1983), specifically stated that it was a bill "to consolidate our nonagricultural
trade responsibilities." (Emphasis added.) Including agriculture is highly controversial because the
Agriculture Department does not want to lose control of its trading powers and subject itself to the illeffects of another situation similar to the boggled Russian grain deal. "[T]he powerful farm lobbies
will fight this tooth and nail." Bingham, U.S. Trade That Goes Beyond Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 1982, at A18, col. 4. "A failing of the Roth and Reagan plans is that they don't disturb the Agriculture Department's domain over farm exports--commonly regarded as politically untouchable." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at A26, col. 1. An excellent discussion of the inclusion of agricultural trade can
be found in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, PROPOSALS TO
ESTABLISH A DEPARTMENT OF TRADE (1984) at 39-41.

80. The entire country will benefit by avoiding incidents like the failed Russian grain deal. See supra note
78. If agricultural concerns had been integrated into the entire trade policy making process, such a
major sale would only have been consummated after analyzing the ramifications on the entire system.
Since the United States supplies 20% of the world's grain, it is a powerful trade weapon, see supra note
7. This, however, is precisely what the Agricultural Department fears-that it will be used merely as a
weapon and not in the best interest of agricultural producers. When including it in a new trade department, Congress must carefully circumscribe the limits the new department will have over agricultural sales.
81. S. 121. The Trade Reorganization Act of 1983, supra note 79.
82. Section 6(2)(c) of S. 121 specifically states that Commerce's functions relating to "negotiation and
implementation of bilateral and multilateral commercial agreements and trade agreements with foreign countries" will be transferred to the new trade department. Id. This is crucial to avoid redundant negotiating parties which send incorrect or conflicting messages to trading partners.
83. S. 1990 supra note 47, specifically delineates what State (§ 6(b)(1-3)) and Treasury (§ 6(d)) lose, while
S. 121 lacks this specificity.
84. Introducing S. 121, Senator Roth stated:
[O]verall responsibility for agricultural trade matters would remain with the Secretary of Agriculture. In cases that could affect trade in agricultural products, however, my legislation would
require that the Secretaries of Trade and Agriculture consult closely. It would further mandate
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bill can potentially create a protectionist-leaning bureaucracy by transferring to
the new Trade Department all of the domestic sector economic analysis bureaus
currently included in Commerce. 5 Undoubtedly, these bureaus' domestic sector
economic analysis is crucial to any judgment regarding the impact a trade policy
will have on the domestic economy. Nevertheless, to avoid recreating a large,
unmanageable, and ill-focused bureaucracy, these bureaus should not be embedded in the trade department. A more efficient solution would be to allow the
Commerce Department to retain all domestic analysis functions and to encourage
the Trade Department to consult Commerce for information and services when
necessary. It is imperative for a new Trade Department to retain the efficiency of
the current USTR office. Moving a large portion of the Commerce Department's
34,000 employees would not retain this efficiency.8 6 Rather, S. 121 would only
create a bulky, cumbersome replica of the Commerce Department under a new
title.
PROPOSED SOLUTION: DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The present Congressional proposals recognize the problems in trade policy
organization without offering a comprehensive solution. Each proposal solves
certain selected problems while ignoring others. After analyzing the flaws of each
solution, it is clear that creating a cabinet-level department devoted solely to international trade would be the most effective means of resolving the problems discussed. Establishing such a department would effectively fulfill the constitutional
mandate that Congress "regulate commerce with foreign nations. "87 Congress
would retain minimal supervisory powers 8 while allowing the Executive to retain
ultimate authority to formulate policy. Most importantly, the new Department of
International Trade would have a bureaucratic structure that would offer consistency and stability in policy formulation despite changes in administrations.8 9
The creation of a new Department of Trade should effectively address all of
the following issues in order to fully resolve the present problems in foreign trade
policy formulation and implementation:

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

that, in international negotiations and consultations involving agricultural commodities produced in significant quantities in the United States, the Secretary of Agriculture would vicechair the U.S. delegations. This would guarantee that our producers of wheat, for example,
would be strongly represented in talks affecting their markets and production decisions.
129 CONG. REC. S593, (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). Having the Secretary of Agriculture participate in the
negotiations would help to ensure that negotiated treaties can feasibly be implemented. However,
ultimate responsibility for trade in agricultural products must lie with the Trade Department precisely
because of the importance of agriculture to the overall economic picture and because of the Agriculture Department's lack of expertise in trade and in the balancing of strategic and political needs.
S. 121 supra note 121, at § 6(b)(1)(A),(B). See supra notes 58, 75, and 76 for a discussion of this
protectionist tendency.
The Commerce Department has 34,457 employees. See supra note 39. The American Enterprise
Institute estimates that non-trade activities account for one half the personnel in the Commerce Department. PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, supra note 79.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
Congress would retain the right to veto the Executive's nominations for Secretaries and
Undersecretaries.
For the most part, only the high level officials change with each administration; thus, the vast majority
of the underlying bureaucracy does not change, lending stability to policy making and implementation. This may help overcome some critics' fear of change. According to Cohen, "[s]everal persons
have expressed a preference for the existing fragmented, often inefficient system. They argue the latter
represents a known given and is therefore preferable to the risk of having an efficient, fine-tuned apparatus fall under the control of the other side." Hearings on S. 1990, supra note 4, at 66 (testimony of
Dr. Stephen D. Cohen, in 1978 an Assoc. Prof. at the School of Int'l Service, The American Univ.,
Wash. D.C.)

1985]

Department of Trade

1.

Provide for a Sole Trade Negotiator.
The mandate of a new Department of International Trade must state
unequivocally that its head, or an immediate designee thereof, is the sole negotiator on all
trade agreements to which the United States is a party. This will reduce unnecessary duplication of work, lessen internal struggles for power, and, most importantly, eliminate the conflicting signals often sent to U.S. trading partners.
2. Retain Domestic Functions in Commerce.
The new Department of International Trade should be strictly limited to foreign trade matters. Domestic sector analysis bureaus should remain in the Commerce Department where their research, analysis, and expertise can be tapped
when needed by foreign trade analysts without recreating the same bulky
bureaucracy.
3.

Include Agricultural Trade Issues.

No comprehensive solution to the current trade policy problems can exclude
agriculture. The critical role that agriculture plays in overall trade requires its
inclusion in the new Department. The farm lobby must be overcome in order to
improve international trade and attain a comprehensive trade philosophy. Exclusion of agriculture would only prolong the present problems of: a) lack of synchronization between agricultural and other trade issues, and b) lack of a single
chief negotiator.
4. Provide Complete Control Over Policy Implementation.
Congress must give the new Department of International Trade full authority
to implement trade decisions even when the decisions transcend traditional departmental boundaries. The authorizing legislation should clearly state that these
other departments must relinquish their present authority, both statutory and customary, in specific areas relating to trade.9" The Secretary of International Trade
can guide the policy of smaller agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank and
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, as the USTR presently does through
their boards of directors. Responsibility for daily implementation should remain
within the smaller agencies themselves in order to ensure efficiency.
5.

Retain a Flexible, Policy-Oriented Structure.

To promote maximum efficiency, the Department must remain small and
manageable, performing only essential functions. 9' Structural flexibility is essential to enable the Department to meet the changing national needs of industry,
agriculture, and businesses of all size. The Department should be policy-oriented
and thereby able to synthesize the strategic, political, and economic elements that
are inherent in every trade decision. Such a structure promotes comprehensive
decisions and precludes the need for other departments such as State, Treasury,
and Defense to intervene and assert their authority.
90.
91.

A good example is in the area of export controls. For a discussion of the "turf battle" over administration of export controls, see N.Y. Times, July 4, 1984, at A 1, col. 3.
Stephen D. Cohen has suggested that a new trade department could be as small as 750 people, most of
whom could be taken from existing positions in other departments. He also compared a possible
reorganization of the United States to a successful French reorganization. S. COHEN, supra note 1, at
169.
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Elimination of Internal Power Struggles.

The new Department of International Trade must be a cabinet department to
best fulfill its purposes. As a cabinet department, the new Department of International Trade would have equal status with the State, Defense, Commerce and
Treasury Departments. Moreover, Congress must give the new Trade Department authority over these departments in limited and specified areas.92 This
structure would give the new department unassailable authority on trade issues
and would eliminate present struggles for power and glory.9 3
ORGANIZATION OF A PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The key figure in the new Department of International Trade will be the secretary of the Department. Ideally, this person would also be the chief trade negotiator. This would ensure consistency in policy as it is received from the President
and negotiated with U.S. trading partners. If, however, the negotiator's position
is in itself a full-time job, then Congress should designate an opening for a Special
Assistant for Trade Negotiations immediately under the secretary. The secretary
would remain responsible for cabinet duties with the President and for management of the entire department including the Special Assistant for Trade Negotiations. The secretary would command three working units: Policy Control and
Coordination; Research and Development; and Policy Implementation. (See
appendix.)
Policy Control and Coordination
The Policy Control and Coordination (PCC) division would be the central
coordinator through which all information would flow both horizontally, between
the Research and Development (R & D) and the Policy Implementation divisions,
and vertically, from the three divisions up to the Secretary. The PCC would have
three functions, each of which would be carried out by a separate subunit. First,
and of primary importance, is the coordination of goals. The subunit responsible
for such coordination must fuse the current administration's trade goals with the
goals emerging from the research and development think tanks.94 Second, PCC
must anticipate developing areas of future needs. The responsible PCC subunit
would search the spectrum of trade issues for potential trouble areas that, once
recognized, would be referred to the R&D unit for more thorough research. As
the R&D unit researches assigned areas, it may uncover new areas which PCC
may decide to pursue further. Thus, suggestions of new areas to research will
arise both out of PCC and R&D itself. Third, the PCC subunit should act as a
review board to ensure that the implementation sector correctly translates the
trade department goals into daily operations.
Research and Development
The second unit of a new Department of International Trade would be the
92.

93.
94.

For example, the new department must have authority over the Commerce and State Departments in
the area of trade negotiations; it must have authority over the Agriculture Department on agricultural
trade issues and on negotiating agricultural trade agreements, and it must have authority over the
Commerce and Treasury Departments on countervailing duty and export control issues.
At a March (1983) hearing, Baldrige sarcastically noted his view of the government's divided responsibility for trade functions: "The U.S. Trade Representative has all the glamorous work - making
policy and negotiating - while Commerce does all the work." 41 CONG. Q. 899, May 7, 1983.
Such an organization would avoid the crises discussed. See supra notes 40-43.
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Research and Development sector. This unit would also consist of three subunits:
Economic, Strategic, and Political. These areas are singled out since they are intrinsically involved in any trade policy decision. The Economic subunit would
analyze both the internal, domestic impact and the international economic ramifications of certain trade decisions. This subunit would rely on data and experts
working in other governmental departments, notably the Commerce Department's domestic sector analysis bureaus. The Strategic subunit of R&D would
concern itself with the nation's military and security interests as they interrelate
with trade decisions. As a specific example, this unit would include among its
responsibilities the East-West trade situation.9" The Political subunit would analyze all remaining nonmilitary and noneconomic trade situations having political
ramifications either at home or abroad. For example, the Political subunit would
consider issues such as sales of technology to Third World countries and human
rights issues relating to trade.96 Matters which involve all three concerns, such as
agricultural trade, would be analyzed accordingly by all three subunits of R&D.
In theory, no new posistion need be created to staff the new R&D division.97
Personnel and resources, notably experts in East-West trade, can be drawn from
the existing trade staffs98 which will be eliminated by this reorganization. The
Trade Department could absorb the USTR's office and the international trade
units of Commerce in their entirety.
Policy Implementation
The third unit of the new Department of International Trade would be the
Policy Implementation unit. This unit would implement the work of the other
two units and the work of the negotiator. After the Executive outlines the general
trade goals, the PCC and R&D units will research and coordinate these goals into
specific policies. The chief negotiator articulates these goals at bilateral and multilateral sessions. Then the Policy Implementation unit would enforce the specific
commitments of the negotiator. For example, the Implementation Unit's tasks
could include overseeing the enforcement of the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws.9 9 The Implementation Unit would need to have authority over certain

areas of other departments" ° in order to ensure that previous power struggles will
95.
96.

See supra notes 17-20.
A relevant trade issue is whether or not the United States should trade with countries such as South
Africa, Chile, or Argentina which have a consistent pattern of human rights violations. The domestic
political ramifications of such a decision, and the decision itself, would be analyzed in the PCC
subunit.
97. Personnel and resources can be drawn from the numerous existing trade sections in the other departments. This can be done at all levels of the reorganization, beginning with the USTR's job and salary
becoming that of the new Secretary of Trade. Trade could absorb the USTR's office and the international trade unit of Commerce in their entirety. Since no new people would need to be hired, start up
costs could be minimized.
98. See supra note 17.
99. The antidumping law is codified in the Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-740, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West
1980), and in Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101 19 U.S.C. 2501, 93 Stat. 144.
The countervailing duty law is the Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 701-707, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (West 1980),
added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144.
Until 1979, the Treasury Department administered these two laws, receiving much criticism for its
failure to enforce them properly. For a discussion, see Graham, supra note 1, at 227. In 1979, the
responsibility for administering both laws was shifting to the Commerce Department with overall
responsibility for policy supervision vested in the office of the USTR. See Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra
note 22, at §§ 2a and 2c. This placed responsibility for supervision in one department and administration in another. A new unified trade department would solve this problematic dichotomy.
100. The implementation branch would need authority over the areas which Congress might choose not to
include in the new department but which still relate to trade in some manner. An example is the
customs area.
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not be renewed. Congress should give the Implementation Unit ultimate authority to enforce international trade policies manifested in both specific treaty and
nontreaty agreements.
CONCLUSION
The past confusion and obfuscation of national trade policy demands that
Congress create a new cabinet-level Department of International Trade. For the
good of the economy and the United States trade position as a whole, Congress
must unite to solve the trade policy dilemma.' 0 ' A cabinet Department of International Trade would give the nation a single negotiator and an institutionalized
mechanism for the research, creation, and implementation of a consistent national
trade policy. Legislators faithful to the Constitution's mandate that Congress
"regulate commerce with foreign nations" should realize that this can only be
done effectively when this power is centralized and coordinated in a Department
of International Trade.
Christine M. North *

101. Trade proposals have historically had difficulty in Congress because the issues involved cut across
committee boundaries creating jurisdictional squabbles. See 15 NAT'L J. 1211, June 11, 1983 and the
CONG. Q., May 7, 1983, at 899 for examples of this in dealing with S. 121. The Senate Finance
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee were the motivating forces behind the trade
reorganization of 1979. See Graham, supra note 1, at 222. The Senate Finance Committee should
once again pick up the lead and join forces with the eager Governmental Affairs Committee, chaired
by Senator Roth, author of S. 1990 and S. 121, and lead the country towards a solution.
B.S., Georgetown University, 1982; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1985.
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